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RECENT BOOKS 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW. By Phillip C. Jessup. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 1956. Pp. 113. $3. 
In this series of Storr lectures delivered at the Yale Law School, Phillip 
C. Jessup launches an assault on the barriers of classifications and distinc-
tions traditionally separating legal disciplines which in his view hamper 
progress toward solutions of problems of "transnational" character. In 
order to minimize the distinctions a new concept is offered: transnational 
law "to include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend 
national frontiers." Transnational situations arise when the passport of 
an American is challenged in Europe; when an American corporation ex-
tracts oil in Venezuela; when the United States Government negotiates 
with the Soviet Union on the unification of Germany; when the United 
Nations buys and ships milk for the Children's Emergency Fund; when 
the International Chamber of Commerce as a "non-governmental organiza-
tion" takes part in a conference called by the Economic and Social Council 
of the UN. Transnational law includes both private and public interna-
tional law, national law, as well as other, rules from a variety of sources 
which do not wholly fit into standard categories such as perhaps the rules 
of procedure and regulations of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. The rules of transnational law may be applied by a national 
court, the International Court of Justice, an international arbitration 
tribunal, the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community 
as well as by governmental negotiators seeking political adjustment of con-
flicting national interests: thus, it is necessary to avoid thinking in terms 
of any particular forum. 
The author who so brilliantly represented the United States in the 
United Nations debates on the Moroccan controversy demonstrates the 
"universality of human problems" underlying transnational situations in 
a little two-scene drama: an over-protected wife matured since her early 
marriage and tired of her domineering husband goes to Reno to get a 
divorce; Morocco, grown self-confident under the impact of nationalism 
and tired of being protected by France, goes to the UN to get her indepen-
dence. In this vein the author develops in the first chapter the theme of 
the basic similarity of legal problems arising between individuals, corpora-
tions, communities, states, organizations of states. 
In the second chapter entitled "Power To Deal With Problems" the 
learned Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at 
Columbia University focuses upon the problems of jurisdiction and partic-
ularly upon the distinction between jurisdictional rules in criminal and 
civil cases. This distinction is sharpened by the practice in international 
law treatises of dealing substantially with criminal jurisdiction only. On 
the other hand the books on conflict of laws (including the Restatement) 
generally confine their attention to civil jurisdiction. Should there be 
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different jurisdictional rules, he inquires, for the criminal and for the 
civil proceedings under the Sherman Antitrust Act where the case involves 
transnational elements? Granted the "due process" requirements under the 
United States constitutional law, the question is raised whether there is 
(from the standpoint of transnational law) a fundamentally good reason 
for insisting on different jurisdictional requirements in civil and criminal 
cases and indeed for relegating the two types of jurisdiction to two different 
bodies of law, international law and conflict of laws. 
A fleeting parallel review is given of the bases claimed by states as 
adequate for exercise of criminal and civil jurisdiction. Nationality and 
"temporary allegiance," the territorial principle, the protective and univer-
sal principles and the principle of passive personality (nationality of the 
victim) are examined as bases for criminal jurisdiction asserted by states 
under international law. To these are juxtaposed the Restatement bases for 
the exercise of civil jurisdiction: physical presence within the state, domi-
cile, consent, certain acts done within the state, and-in a limited sense-
nationality. No pretense is made to completeness and one only wishes the 
author had developed further this interesting confrontation. In the view 
of this writer a full study may well lead to the conclusion that at least in 
some respects different requirements are desirable for criminal and civil 
jurisdiction even if the problem is viewed from the broadest policy per-
spective. 
The author points to an increase in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction 
based on the protective principle, with respect to acts affecting the security 
and integrity of the state. That this principle "lends itself to extravagant 
extensions of State power" is apparent not only from the examples offered 
by the author, but also from a provision of the United States Atomic 
Energy Act. According to this provision it is unlawful "for any person to ... 
directly or indirectly engage in the production of any special nuclear mate-
rial outside the United States"1 except under specified conditions. The 
"person" is defined as "any individual, corporation, ... group, any State 
... any foreign government .... "2 
A novel type of jurisdictional problem which might be added to those 
mentioned by Dr. Jessup arises from the creation of "supranational" in-
stitutions with direct powers over individuals and corporations. A German 
coal consumer group in the European Coal and Steel Community asked a 
German court in Stuttgart to enjoin a German selling agency from putting 
into effect a new selling arrangement which the plaintiffs considered re-
strictive and as such contrary to the Community Treaty as well as violating 
their property rights under the German Civil Code. Under the Treaty the 
High Authority, a Community organ, has the exclusive right (subject to an 
168 Stat. 932 (1954), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §2077(a)(3). 
2 68 Stat. 923 (1954), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §2014(q). 
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appeal to the Community Court of Justice) to determine the existence of 
such Treaty violation. The German court held that it had no jurisdiction 
to grant relief until the High Authority had made such determination.3 
It is interesting to note that in the author's view the bases of jurisdic-
tion mentioned earlier such as territoriality or nationality do not provide 
per se a limitation on jurisdictional power. Such limitation flows from 
"what we may call a balance of power, which it has been found appropriate 
and convenient to establish among the states of the world." 
If, as the author affirms, the traditional bases of territoriality, nationality 
and the like are not adequate in that they have developed "beyond the 
boundaries of their historic justifications" largely through legal fictions, 
what then should be the test for the proper exercise of jurisdiction by a 
state in a transnational situation? To this question the author offers the 
following answer: "It would be the function of transnational law to re-
shuffle the cases and to deal out jurisdiction in the manner most conducive 
to the needs and convenience of all members of the international com-
munity. The fundamental approach would not start with sovereignty or 
power but from the premise that jurisdiction is essentially a matter of 
procedure which could be amicably arranged among the nations of the 
world." (p. 71) 
The third and last chapter of this stimulating book deals with "The 
Choice of Law Governing the Problems." The International Court of 
Justice applies international law from sources defined in its statute: treaty 
law, rules of customary international law, "general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations" and as subsidiary sources, judicial decisions 
and teachings of scholars. What law is applied by the Administrative Tri-
bunal of the United Nations if a plaintiff employee of the United Nations 
seeks damages for a breach of his employment contract concluded and to 
be performed in New York? Neither the UN Staff Regulations nor the 
Staff Rules which are made part of such contract will supply answers to 
every disagreement under the contract. "To what law will the Tribunal 
look for further guidance?" What law governs a contract for the purchase 
by the United Nations of supplies and equipment when suit is brought 
thereon in a New York court? It seems to this reviewer that this last query 
cannot be answered in isolation from the very basic and general question: 
what choice of law rules will an American court follow in a transnational 
transaction considering the pre~ent state of the "choice of law" rules in 
the United States? 
It seems regrettable to this writer that relatively little systematic thought 
has been given in the literature to the restraints which might be derived 
from public international law, upon the freedom of national courts in the 
3 City of Stuttgart v. Oberrheinische Kohlenunion A.G., Landgericht Stuttgart, 
Germany, Aug. 10, 1953, Recueil Sirey, Jurisprudence 4, 1 (1954). 
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choice of law (and for that matter in the choice of rules governing civil 
jurisdiction). This is due in part to the fact there are only very few instances 
of diplomatic intercession based on an alleged violation of a conflict of 
laws rule except of course where such rule was embodied in a treaty, a 
common practice-as Dr. Jessup points out-in Latin America and in 
Europe. In the United States-because the choice of law rules are considered 
within the domain of the individual states-a treaty obligation governing 
the choice of law is a rare bird indeed: for instance, under the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund an American court is 
bound to give certain effect to certain foreign exchange regulations enacted 
by other states, members of the Fund regardless of any choice of law rule 
of the forum.4 Thus public international law, it appears to this reviewer, 
in its present state of development and in the absence of treaties is not 
likely to offer much guidance here. Nor do the rigid formulae of the Re-
statement provide adequate solutions even to intranational choice of law 
problems among the states of the Union. Professor Jessup suggests that 
the court might follow Dean Cavers' view that the choice of law "would 
not be the result of the automatic operation of a rule or principle of selec-
tion but of a search for a just decision in the . . . case.''5 This writer has 
some question whether this approach leaving the choice of the law .to the 
"personalized" concept of justice of the individual judge offers a satisfactory 
solution in transnational transactions. Another approach advocated by 
other authorities calls for choosing the law of the state with prevailing 
interest.6 Professor Yntema urges that in the absence of an established rule 
the court should choose the law reflecting most closely modem legislative 
trends as determined by a comparative analysis of the legislation in the 
field.7 The American experience dramatizes the difficulty of developing 
rational generally acceptable rules of choice of law. The problem of ob-
taining an international consensus on rules which would be followed in 
transnational cases by most or all states of the international community is 
nothing short of baffling. In any event, Dr. Jessup urges that in the choice 
of law neither the character of parties (whether individuals, corporations, 
states or international organizations) nor the type of forum (national, 
international-and one may add "supranational") nor the distinction be-
tween civil and criminal law or public and private law should control 
the choice of the rule to be applied. 
Professor Jessup points to what he considers "helpful precedents" in 
4 Art. VIII 2 (b) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund; 
Bretton Woods Agreement Act, 59 Stat. 512 (1945), 22 U.S.C. (1952) §286. 
5 Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 at 
193 (1933). 
6 Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Briggs, "Utility 
of the Jurisdictional Principle in a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws," 6 VAN». L. REv. 
667 (1953). 
7 Yntema, "The Objectives of Private International Law," 35 CAN. B. REv. 771 (1957). 
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the predominantly transnational maritime law where the general process 
has been toward uniformity of substantive rules of law thus reducing the 
difficulties arising from the choice of conflicting laws. The legal instrumen-
talities employed in this unifying process consisted of voluntary inclusion 
of standard provisions into contracts by parties, adoption of identical legis-
lation in many states and finally negotiation of international conventions 
unifying certain rules of law. · 
There is obviously no room for disagreement with the author's conclu-
sion that "if there be any virtue in developing transnational law, much 
more exploration and analysis would need to precede the ponderous tread 
of governmental action." It seems to this writer that intensification of com-
parative studies of legal and social systems is a matter of necessity. The 
study under Professor Schlesinger at the Cornell University Law School 
seeking to define the substance of the "general principles of law" could 
lead to some of the head waters of the stream of common legal experience 
from which a transnational law must draw.8 Dean Roscoe Pound said 
recently that "the complex, crowded, economically unified and mechanically 
operated world of today increasingly makes for a world law with local 
regime of laws made for and adapted to, local special conditions and needs." 
He observed that "reliance upon judicial discovery or application of reason 
·to experience is superseding the political idea of necessary legislative pre-
scribing of rules."9 This thought offers a further interesting line of inquiry 
as do a number of suggestions for studies sketched in broad contours in 
Dr. Jessup's most challenging volume. 
Eric Stein, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
8 Cf. Hazard, "The General Principles of Law," 52 AM. J. INT. L. 91 (1958). 
9N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1957. 
